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The responsibility to save and contribute to a pension is increasingly left to the individual 
worker. Understanding how households save and prepare for retirement is of paramount 
importance. There is concern in the U.S. that many families have little or no wealth even 
close to retirement. In this project, I use data from the Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS), a nationally representative sample of the cohort born between 1931 to 1941, to 
examine the financial situation of older households and their retirement plans. I first show 
that many families have not thought about retirement even though they are a few years 
away from retirement and the event is imminent. This finding confirms the results of 
other surveys, such as the Retirement Confidence Survey, that show that a large majority 
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INTRODUCTION 
The responsibility to save and contribute to a pension is increasingly left to the 
individual worker. For example, the large majority of pension plans are currently defined 
contribution pensions. As a percentage of all private pension plans, defined contribution 
plans increased from 66.8% in 1975 to 92.3% in 1998.
1 When looking at the number of 
active participants, 69% of them have a defined contribution plan by 1998. In defined 
contribution plans, workers have to choose not only the amount of contributions but in 
many cases also how to allocate their pension wealth. The current debate on the 
privatization of Social Security considers putting individuals in charge of allocating a 
portion of their Social Security wealth.  There is little research, however, on the 
difficulties that people face in making decisions about pensions and saving and how they 
overcome the complexities of devising saving plans. Many employers, in particular large 
ones, have started offering financial education to workers.
2 However, there is no clear 
evidence on the effectiveness of financial education in the workplace.  
  Understanding how households save and prepare for retirement is of paramount 
importance. There is concern in the U.S. that many families have little or no wealth even 
close to retirement. Much research is needed to understand the determinants of saving 
and to assess the effectiveness of financial education policies to foster saving. 
  In this project, I use data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to examine 
the financial situation of older households and their retirement plans. I first show that 
many families have not thought about retirement even though they are a few years away 
from retirement and the event is imminent. There are important gender differences that 
                                                           
1 Data is from the U.S. Department of Labor’s Abstract of 1998 Form 5500 Annual Reports. 
   3
emerge in the data; women are less likely to plan for retirement and to have attended a 
retirement seminar. Additionally, women display characteristics that may be conducive to 
low savings. I then examine two measures of wealth holdings—financial and total net 
worth—and report that many families arrive close to retirement with little or no wealth. 
Portfolios are also rather simple: the major asset that families own is the house and close 
to 30% of families hold stocks. However, many families, in particular low-education, 
low-income families and Blacks and Hispanics, hold neither high returns assets (stocks, 
IRAs, business equity), nor basic assets such as checking accounts. 
What are the reasons for such low wealth accumulation and simple portfolios? 
Throughout the paper, I argue that, in addition to many of the traditional explanations, 
planning costs can play a role in explaining the financial situation of these older 
households. In previous works (Lusardi (1999, 2000, 2002), I have shown that planning 
costs affect whether or not people plan, which in turn affects wealth accumulation and 
portfolio choice. In this paper, I examine whether retirement seminars, by affecting 
planning costs, can foster savings and the allocation of portfolio in risky assets, such as 
stocks. Using econometric techniques that account for the fact that attending retirement 
seminars is a choice variable and that seminars are likely to be offered to the workers 
who most need them, I show that seminars are an effective way to foster savings and 
stock holdings. This is particularly the case for those with low education and those who 
save little. My estimates suggest that, by offering financial education, the ratio of non-
pension wealth to permanent income can be increased by 50% for the families at the 
bottom of the distribution and those with low education. Retirement seminars increase the 
ratio of total wealth (comprehensive of pension and Social Security) over permanent   4
income by 15-20% for both high and low education families. Taken together, this 
evidence suggests that retirement seminars are an effective way to foster wealth 
accumulation and bolster financial security. 
 
PREVIOUS WORK  
According to the 2001 Employee Benefit Research Institute’s (EBRI) Retirement 
Confidence Survey (RCS), a large proportion of workers have done little or no planning 
for retirement. Only 39% of workers have tried to determine with some accuracy how 
much they need to save to fund their retirement.  This figure is a bit higher than in 
previous years. In the early 1990s, often less than one third of workers tried to calculate 
how much money they needed to save for retirement. When asked why the calculation 
was not attempted, many respondents replied that it was too difficult and that they did not 
know where to find help to do it.  
Using data from the HRS, Lusardi (2000a, 2000b) reports that lack of planning is 
pervasive even among older workers, who are 5 to 10 years away from retirement. These 
findings are consistent with several other studies, which document that many workers do 
not possess the information necessary for making saving decisions. Gustman and 
Steinmeier (1999b) report that many workers are not well informed about their Social 
Security and pension benefits. Workers are often incorrect about the type of pension plan 
they have and the benefits associated with it. The 2001 RCS documents that more than 
half of current workers expect to reach full eligibility for Social Security benefits sooner 
(age 65 or earlier) than they actually will. An earlier survey from EBRI in 1996 shows 
that only 55 percent of workers knew that U.S. government bonds have provided a lower   5
rate of return averaged over the past 20 years than the U.S. stock market. Bernheim 
(1998) surveys several studies and shows too that workers are often ill-equipped to make 
saving plans.  
An important finding by Lusardi (1999, 2000a) is that planning has effects on 
both saving behavior and portfolio choice. Households whose head has not planned for 
retirement accumulate much less wealth than households whose head has done some 
planning. This result holds true even after accounting for many determinants of wealth 
and after accounting for pension and Social Security wealth. In addition, households that 
do not plan are less likely to invest in high return assets such as stocks. Examining data 
for workers who have already retired, Lusardi (2000a) also shows that those who did not 
plan report experiencing a less satisfying retirement. Consistent with these findings, the 
2001 RCS reports that half of those who reported having made calculations of retirement 
saving needs have subsequently made changes in their behavior. Of these, more than half 
say they have started to save more. 
Other studies have also shown that households do not make provisions for 
retirement and adverse events. Weir and Willis (1998) use data from the HRS to show 
that many women are vulnerable to the death of their spouse. A husband’s death can 
precipitate his widow’s entry into poverty. Warshawsky and Ameriks (2000) perform the 
experiment of importing the current wealth holdings of U.S. households, as reported in 
the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), into one of the most popular financial planners. 
They find that about half of working middle class American households will not have 
fully funded retirements. Some will actually run out of resources very shortly after 
retirement. One of the problems that these authors as well as Lusardi (2000a) emphasize   6
is that many households have limited resources until late in their life-cycle or start saving 
very late when it is not possible to accumulate much These results are consistent with the 
work by Hurd and Zissimopoulos (2000), who examine subjective information about past 
saving behavior. When asked to evaluate their saving, a stunningly high proportion of 
respondents (73%) in the HRS report having saved too little over the past 20 and 30 
years. Similar findings are reported by Moore and Mitchell (2000). They use data from 
the HRS to determine how much wealth (including Social Security and pensions) older 
households have, and how much they would need to save if they wished to preserve 
consumption levels after retirement. They conclude that the majority of older households 
will not be able to maintain current levels of consumption into retirement without 
additional saving. In particular, the median HRS household would still have to save an 
additional 16 percent of income to smooth consumption after retirement.  
  Empirical work on consumption suggests that these predictions may turn out to be 
accurate. There is mounting evidence that consumption falls sharply at retirement, and at 
a greater level than can be rationalized by explanations consistent with traditional models 
of saving and/or extensions that take into account non-separabilities between 
consumption and leisure such as the costs of going to work (see, among others, 
Hamermesh (1984), and Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg (2001)). Most importantly, 
Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg (2001) show that there exists a strong negative 
correlation between retirement savings and the magnitude of the consumption drop; 
consumption falls sharply for those with little wealth.  
There are many reasons why households accumulate little for retirement but, as 
Lusardi (1999, 2000a, 2000b) argues, planning costs may play an important role in   7
explaining household saving behavior. Not only do households have to spend time 
collecting data and information about the variables that are needed for making saving 
decisions, but they may also have to overcome the stress of dealing with an unpleasant 
event.  Retirement is not an event that many people look forward to. This may represent a 
time when individuals are lonely, unattractive and unhealthy. There is evidence in the 
HRS that respondents are very worried about illnesses and health problems after 
retirement (Lusardi (2000a)). 
How large must planning costs be to prevent so many individuals from planning 
for retirement? A model taken from the literature in behavioral economics suggests that 
even small costs can have large effects. For agents that display hyperbolic discounting, 
even small costs that have to be paid immediately lead to wide regions of inaction: agents 
postpone actions that imply immediate costs (Akerlof (1991), Laibson (1997), 
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a,1999b). In this alternative model, consumers discount the 
immediate future at a high rate, and this high rate combined with a cost that has to be 
paid immediately gives rise to much inaction. In fact, contrary to the predictions of 
traditional models, some actions may never be taken; if planning takes time and effort, 
consumers may continue to procrastinate indefinitely and never put any effort into 
planning. This may be particularly relevant for behavior such as saving and portfolio 
choice. There are usually no deadlines or specific periods when decisions have to be 
made. Decisions can be made every day, but since one needs to put time and effort into 
them, decisions can be substantially delayed and perhaps never made. 
 As additional evidence that planning for retirement is considered an important 
but difficult task, many employers have started offering financial education to their   8
employees. Financial education is particularly prevalent among firms offering defined 
contribution pensions, where workers have to make their own decisions on how to 
allocate pension funds. An important question, however, is whether these initiatives have 
any effect on workers’ behavior. 
A few studies have looked at the effects of financial education in the work-place 
on private savings or contributions to pension funds (see, among others, McCarthy and 
Turner (1996), Bernheim (1995, 1998), Bayer, Bernheim and Scholz (1996), Bernheim 
and Garrett (2002), Clark and Schieber (1998), and Madrian and Shea (2001)). The 
empirical findings are still mixed. There is evidence of some effects of financial 
education, but the form of education seems to matter. For example, Bernheim and Garrett 
(2002) and Bayer, Bernheim and Scholtz (1996) find that programs that rely on print 
media (newsletters, plan description, etc.) have generally no effect on participation or 
contributions to pensions. While retirement seminars are found to be effective, they seem 
to affect only certain aspects of behavior, for example participation in pensions and the 
amount of contributions, but not, for example, total savings (Bernheim and Garrett 
(2002), McCarthy and Turner (1996)).  However, these and other similar studies suffer 
from severe data shortcomings. For example, they often have very limited information 
about workers’ characteristics and the characteristics of their pension plan. Most 
importantly, they have limited information about private wealth. There is still a debate on 
what is the appropriate measure of wealth to consider when looking at accumulation for 
retirement and whether, for example, one should include housing when calculating 
retirement wealth, since housing has a consumption in addition to an investment purpose. 
In addition, a series of studies show that there is a limited downsizing of housing after   9
retirement and a limited use of contracts such as reverse mortgages.
3 Most importantly, 
many studies do not consider pension and Social Security wealth, which are two major 
components of total household retirement savings. As reported by Gustman and 
Steinmeier (1999a), pension and Social Security wealth accounts for approximately half 
of total accumulation. Leaving these components of wealth out and/or concentrating on 
narrow definitions of accumulation can have important effects on the empirical findings. 
In the next section, I look at data from he HRS and report some simple statistics about 
savings and planning for retirement.  
 
DATA AND EMPIRICAL FACTS 
The HRS offers a unique set of information that overcomes many of the 
shortcomings of previous research on savings. This survey, which covers a sample of 
U.S. households whose respondents were born between 1931 and 1941, provides detailed 
information on wealth and the retirement process with a focus on health, labor markets, 
and economic and psycho-social factors. Questions about wealth are asked to the 
financially knowledgeable person in the household.
4 
Below, I briefly examine five important sets of information that provide insights into 
household saving behavior and explain the differences in patterns of accumulation: 
                                                           
3See, among others, Venti and Wise (1990, 1991), and Sheiner and Weil (1992). 
4There are several advantages in using the HRS. First, there is rich information about household 
characteristics, which is not present in other U.S. data sets. Second, since it concentrates on a specific 
cohort, the sample size is bigger than in other household data sets that report information about wealth and 
cover the entire population. Third, the implementation of new techniques to elicit information about wealth 
has led to rather accurate wealth reports. For a thorough examination of the HRS, the quality of the data, 
and comparisons with other data sets, see Juster and Smith (1997) and Smith (1995). See also the data 
appendix.   10
1) Planning: Three indicators of planning activities are provided in the survey: 
information on how much respondents have thought about retirement, whether they have 
attended a retirement seminar, and whether they have asked Social Security to calculate 
their retirement benefits. Since planning can be the result of choice, it is also important to  
have information about variables that influence  choice such as planning costs. Variables 
that can proxy for these costs, such as sibling data and location and characteristics of 
firms, are available in the HRS as will be explained in detail later. 
  2) Past economic circumstances: The HRS provides information on past economic 
circumstances such as past shocks. Respondents are asked whether they have been 
unemployed in the past. In addition, they are asked to report whether they faced any 
episodes that made it difficult to meet financial needs. The survey also reports positive 
shocks in the past that affect household wealth, such as receiving inheritances, money 
from insurance settlements, or money from relatives and friends. 
  3) Expectations about the future: In addition to the past, it is important to have 
information about future resources. This is critically important to evaluate models of 
savings. In the HRS, respondents are asked to report the chances that home prices will 
increase more than the increase in the general price level, and that Social Security (SS) 
will become less generous in the future.  Respondents are also asked to report their 
expectations of living up to 75 and 85.
5 In addition, respondents report the chance they 
will have to give major financial help to family members in the next 10 years and to work 
full time after age 62 and 65. 
                                                           
5An excellent examination of subjective probabilities in the HRS is provided in Hurd and McGarry (1995).   11
  Respondents are asked about the chance of losing their job in the next year. I use 
this variable to construct a measure of income variation.
6 If households have a 
precautionary saving motive, they care not only about the decline in income at retirement, 
but also about risk, which can be measured empirically by the variance of earnings. In 
Lusardi (1998), I show that that precautionary saving is an important motive, even among 
this sample of older households. 
 4)  Preferences: Another not yet well-explored dimension along which households 
can differ is preferences. While it is very hard to measure individual preferences, it is also 
the case that parameters, such as the coefficient of risk aversion or the rate of time 
preference, play a pivotal role in many models of intertemporal optimization. There is a 
way to infer this information in the HRS and therefore to account for variation in 
preferences when explaining household financial decisions. In particular, I use the 
analysis provided in Barsky, Kimball, Juster, and Shapiro (1997) on willingness to take 
gambles to construct proxies for the coefficient of risk aversion. The HRS also provides 
information on the strength of the bequest motive, since respondents are asked to report 
whether they plan to leave a bequest to future generations. Information about inter- and 
intra-generational transfers can be proxied using information on parents. Demographic 
variables that could be related to the rate of time preference, such as education, race, and 
country of origin, are also present in the survey. Additionally, data on smoking, drinking, 
caring about one’s health, and exercising regularly can be used to proxy for individual 
heterogeneity. 
                                                           
6See Lusardi (1998).   12
  5) Pension and Social Security wealth: Using the HRS, it is possible to link to the 
Social Security records of respondents and use that information to calculate Social 
Security wealth.
7 However, not every household has given authorization to access their 
Social Security records, and I have used imputed Social Security wealth data for those 
households.
8 It is also possible to construct pension wealth from the self-reported pension 
information.
9 Thus, I can rely on a complete measure of household accumulation when 
examining savings behavior. Many of the calculations involved in deriving pension and 
Social Security wealth are quite lengthy and require assumptions about the future and 
what households know. Gustman, Mitchell, Samwick and Steinmeier (1999) describe the 
pension and Social Security data in detail and show they are two important components 
of total accumulation for retirement. 
 
WHAT EXPLAINS LACK OF PLANNING? 
As mentioned before, the HRS provides information on indicators of planning. I 
consider the sample of households in the first wave of the HRS, excluding those where 
respondents are partially or fully retired, and those with respondents younger than 50 or 
older than 61. Since the HRS oversamples Black and Hispanic households as well as 
households from Florida, I use household weights to obtain statistics representative of the 
population throughout the empirical work. 
                                                           
7Special authorization is needed to access Social Security records. For detail on the construction of Social 
Security wealth, see Mitchell, Olson and Steinmeier (2000).  
8I thank Al Gustman and Tom Steinmeier for providing the imputed Social Security wealth data. For more 
information on pension and Social Security wealth in the HRS, see Gustman and Steinmeier (1999a,b). 
9For a detailed explanation of the construction of the pension data, see Venti and Wise (2000).   13
 In section K on “Retirement Plans,” respondents are asked to report how much 
they have thought about retirement. Respondents (who plan to retire) can only choose 
from four different answers, which are reported at the top of Table 1. The first feature to 
notice is that 12% of respondents (629 out of 5,118) do not plan to retire, at least 
completely. A large proportion of respondents in this group consist of business owners 
and the self-employed.
10 Second, approximately 30% of respondents in the sample that 
plan to retire (1,331 out of 4,489 respondents) have "hardly thought" about retirement. 
This is a large percentage, in particular considering the age of respondents. Many 
respondents are only a few years away from retirement and the event is imminent. 
   Since the wording of the question under consideration is rather generic and can 
lead to several interpretations, I also report the characteristics of respondents across 
different answer modes (the figures are the mean characteristic in each response group). 
Respondents who do not think about retirement are more likely to be female and a 
minority. Consistent with the fact that education and financial literacy can be more 
conducive to planning (planning costs are lower for these households), respondents who 
do not think about retirement are more likely to have low education. Not only is their 
education low, but also the education of their family of origin tends to be low (father or 
mother does not have a high school education). Individuals who have not thought about 
retirement are also less likely to be married. Additionally, they are less likely to have 
older siblings (older than 62) that could provide some guidance or experience on what 
happens after retirement. Lusardi (2000a) uses the age difference between the respondent 
and his/her oldest sibling to proxy for planning costs. Households who can learn from 
                                                           
10 Most of them will be excluded from the empirical work as they are not asked questions about their 
expectation of losing their job in the coming year. See also the data appendix.   14
their older siblings face lower planning costs.  These costs can help explain some of the 
differences in wealth accumulation in this cohort of older households. 
  The bottom three rows of the table report the average scores on the measures of 
cognitive abilities available in the HRS:  1) ability to think quickly (the score goes from 1 
to 5, where 1 means excellent and 5 poor); 2) memory, which measures the numbers of 
words one person is able to recall in two subsequent trials (the total number of words is 
20, and the total score therefore goes from 0 to 40); and 3) analogy questions, which 
measure one’s ability to report how some things are alike (there are 7 questions totaling 2 
points each for a total score of 14).  Overall the people who have not thought about 
retirement receive the worst average score on all questions. In particular, this group 
scores lower on analogy questions. Again, this indicates that there are several important 
differences across households. Those differences can, in turn, affect the effort and time 
one has to put into retirement planning. 
The other two indicators of planning activities available in the HRS--whether the 
respondent has attended a meeting on retirement and retirement planning organized by  
his/her spouse’s employer and whether he/she has asked Social Security to calculate 
retirement benefits (of husband or spouse)-- are considered in Table 2. Since these 
indicatorsare the focus of the empirical work, I consider a larger set of household 
characteristics.  
Respondents who are male, white, and married are more likely to have done some 
planning activities. Findings concerning education are similar to what was reported in the 
previous table. Households whose head has low education or comes from a family of low 
education are less likely to have attended retirement seminars. Of course, this could result   15
from the fact that these families are less likely to work in firms that offer such seminars. 
Similar findings are obtained when considering those who have asked Social Security to 
calculate their retirement benefits. Again, those who have high education, high income, 
are white and married are more likely to get information about Social Security benefits 
and attend retirement seminars. These households are also more likely to have a pension 
and to invest in retirement assets, such as IRAs and Keoghs. Variables connected to 
cognitive abilities indicate that those who do not plan perhaps face higher planning costs 
in terms of time and effort spent in planning (as their cognitive abilities are lower). 
When considering some other household characteristics, such as whether the 
financially knowledgeable person in the household smokes or stopped smoking, drinks 
heavily, thinks he/she should cut down on drinking, does not exercise, and has talked to a 
doctor about health, one finds that they correlate strongly with planning activities. These 
findings indicate that individual heterogeneity should be taken into account in the 
empirical work.  
When looking at subjective probabilities, another important and unique source of 
information in the HRS, one finds that those who attend a retirement seminar or asked 
Social Security to calculate retirement benefits are less likely to work full-time after age 
62. Those who plan are also less likely to report that they expect house prices to increase 
more than the general price level in the next ten years. This may be an important factor 
for wealth accumulation, as those who expect to receive big capital gains on their house 
(one of the most important assets in household portfolios, as will be reported later) are 
likely to save less and, thus, accumulate less wealth.   16
Fundamentally, these tables indicate that there is a lot of heterogeneity in 
household behavior and, if one cannot account properly for it, one could get a limited 
analysis of what determines planning behavior and incorrect estimates of the effects of 
planning on saving behavior. 
 
GENDER DIFFERENCES IN PLANNING 
Table 1 and 2 show some gender differences in planning. These differences can 
be rather important. Women’s greater longevity implies that wealth must support a longer 
period of retirement than men. In addition, women have lower lifetime earnings, lower 
participation in the labor market, and lower pension coverage rates (see Gustman, 
Mitchell, Samwick and Steimeier (1999) for evidence on the HRS cohort). Thus, women 
stand to benefit a lot from careful planning. Table 3 reports some simple statistics across 
gender in planning indicators as well as other demographic characteristics that can be 
related to planning. 
Every indicator of planning shows that women are much less likely to plan for 
retirement (even though differences are not always statistically significant). A large 
percentage of women indicate they have hardly thought about retirement. Overall, they 
are (somewhat) less likely than men to have attended a retirement seminar and to have 
asked SS to calculate retirement benefits. Note that households whose financially 
knowledgeable person is a woman are more likely to be Black or Hispanic and have 
experienced a family split (divorce or separation). This is rather important as far as 
wealth accumulation is concerned. Using HRS data, both Smith (1995) and Lusardi 
(1999, 2000a) show that wealth accumulation is particularly low for these types of   17
families. Lusardi, Cossa and Krupta (2001) find similar results among younger families, 
suggesting that low accumulation close to retirement may be the result of low savings at 
younger ages. While there are many reasons why this is the case, it is a potential concern 
that many families headed by a woman arrive close to retirement with extremely low 
amounts of wealth. As Table 3 shows, more than 20% of households whose financially 
knowledgeable respondent is female arrive close to retirement with as little as $10,000 in 
total net worth (excluding pension and Social Security wealth). Note, however, that 
female-headed households are also likely to have lower income and lower education than 
households headed by men. 
As already reported by Barsky, Kimball, Juster and Shapiro (1997), women 
display a higher aversion to risk than men. This may play some role not only in the 
accumulation of wealth, but also in portfolio choice. For example, female-headed 
families in the HRS are less likely to hold stocks. They are also less likely to hold IRAs. 
While the preference parameter of one person may not reflect well the decision process of 
the household (see, for example, Mazzocco (2002)), many female-headed household are 
split families and/or families with one adult person only. 
Women are less likely to be heavy smokers or drinkers and are more likely to talk 
to a doctor about their health. These attitudes correlate with planning and with wealth 
accumulation, as some of the empirical work considered later will show. Women’s 
subjective probabilities of living after 75 are higher than men’s (as expected), while they 
do not differ as regards to men in the subjective expectation about future changes in 
Social Security and in home prices. With respect to men, they are less likely to give 
financial help to family members in the future and also to leave bequests. These   18
characteristics may again play a role in explaining the gender differences in patterns of 
wealth accumulation. 
 
HOUSEHOLD SAVINGS CLOSE TO RETIREMENT. 
Before considering the effects of planning and of attending retirement seminars, I 
examine household accumulation and portfolio choice. As mentioned before, it is very 
difficult to define an appropriate measure of household accumulation. Each component of 
wealth displays different characteristics in terms of, for example, liquidity and 
accessibility. Some components of wealth, such as housing equity and vehicles, have 
consumption in addition to investment components. Others, such as business equity, 
display specific features and it is not obvious they should be included in household 
wealth without some modeling of entrepreneurial activity.  
Given the research question under investigation, I first consider two measures of 
household (non-pension) accumulation: financial wealth and total net worth. The first 
measure of wealth (liquid net worth) is defined as the sum of checking and saving 
accounts, certificates of deposits and Treasury bills, bonds, stocks, and other financial 
assets minus short-term debt.  The second measure (total net worth or simply net worth) 
is obtained by adding IRAs and Keoghs, housing equity, other real estate, business 
equity, and vehicles to financial wealth. To look more closely at major components of 
wealth, in Table 4, I also report the amount of wealth in retirement assets (IRAs and 
Keoghs) and housing equity. All values are in 1992 dollars.
11  
                                                           
11 I also use a more comprehensive measure of wealth and consider total accumulation that includes 
pension and Social Security wealth in the empirical work reported later.   19
  The first important feature to note is that there is a tremendous amount of 
heterogeneity in household wealth holdings, even when looking at a narrow age group in 
the population. While some households have amassed large amounts of wealth, others 
have accumulated very little. Considerable differences in wealth are to be expected 
because income varies widely. But the actual variation, from $850 in net worth for 
households at the 10
th percentile to $475,000 in the 90
th percentile, is far larger than 
variation in income. 
It is also apparent from Table 4 that housing is an important asset in many 
household portfolios, and many have little in anything besides home equity. Retirement 
assets, such as IRAs, have been one of the fastest growing components of household 
wealth in the 1980s and 1990s. However, ownership and the amount invested in these 
tax-favored assets are heterogeneous across the sample. Even though not shown in the 
table, a substantial portion of total net worth is also accounted for by business equity.
12 
Even though households owning one or more businesses account for only 15 percent of 
the population in this sample, their wealth holdings are large. The conditional median and 
mean are $75,000 and $281,620, respectively. Again, it is not clear that business equity 
characterizes accumulation for retirement since, in this case, the retirement motive is 
mixed with the enterprise motive. 
  A second important feature to note in Table 4 is the proportion of households that 
arrive close to retirement with little or no wealth. A quarter of the households in the 
sample have less than $30,000 in total net worth. While total net worth is only a partial 
measure of accumulation because it does not include wealth in Social Security and 
                                                           
12 For a more detailed discussion of the importance of business owners to explain wealth accumulation, see 
Hurst and Lusardi (2002) and Gentry and Hubbard (2001).   20
pensions, it is hard to borrow against retirement assets and it is not obvious how 
households with only $850 (the first decile of the distribution of net worth) can offset 
potential shocks to income, health, or family circumstances, and how quickly they can 
accumulate a stock of wealth in the remaining years up to retirement. 
In Table 5, I report wealth holdings across some observable household 
characteristics such as education and marital status, which could serve as crude proxies for 
permanent income. Even when considering this classification, disparities in wealth remain 
huge. Wealth holdings are very low for households whose financial respondent has less than 
a high school education. Households whose head has a college degree have more than twice 
the wealth (considering medians) of households with high school education. When one 
considers a restricted measure of wealth such as liquid net worth, the scenario worsens 
considerably. Many of the households with low education have little or zero holdings of 
financial assets and little total net worth. Wealth is particularly low for those that 
experienced a family split. For example, divorced or separated households have little liquid 
net worth. Looking at medians, married couples have more than 3 times the net worth of 
divorced couples and six time the net worth of separated couples. 
As mentioned before, there are large differences in wealth accumulation between 
genders. Households whose financially knowledgeable person is a woman accumulate much 
less liquid and total net worth. Some of the reasons for these different patterns of 
accumulation can be traced to the differences reported in Table 3, which indicate that 
women differ not only in economic status but also in preferences. 
Given the information on the components of wealth provided in the HRS, one can 
examine the levels as well as the composition of household portfolios (Table 6). I have   21
already mentioned the importance of housing and retirement assets for many of these older 
households, and Table 6 shows that these assets are concentrated among households whose 
financial respondent has at least a high school education. Only a fraction of the population 
hold stocks and bonds, and those assets are also heavily concentrated among households 
whose head has a high school education. Most importantly, the less educated respondents 
are not only less likely to hold stocks and bonds, but they also do not hold basic assets such 
as saving and checking accounts. 
Note that a sizable proportion of households (15%) do not hold any of the 
conventional financial assets (i.e., checking and saving accounts, certificates of deposit and 
Treasury bills, bonds, stocks, IRAs and Keoghs, and other assets). In fact, the composition 
of many portfolios is rather naive: as many as 32% have all of their financial wealth in one 
asset (the proportion goes to 47% if we consider households with zero or only one asset). A 
large fraction of households (49%) do not hold any of the assets that have delivered 
relatively high returns throughout the years (not only real estate and businesses, but also 
bonds and stocks).  
When looking at households with low education, some groups stand out. For 
example, a very large proportion of Hispanics report that they have an elementary school 
education. As many as 36% of Hispanics have an elementary school education and more 
than 58% have less than a high school education. Among blacks, 40% have less than a high 
school education.  
Another important and striking feature among these groups is that they not only lack 
many of the assets that are common to the portfolios in the whole sample (for example, 
stocks, bonds and IRAs), but they do not even hold checking accounts. In this sample, 57%   22
of Black households have a checking account and only 47% of Hispanic households have a 
checking account. Other studies have reported similar findings for younger households 
(Lusardi, Cossa and Krupka (2001)) and this feature seems to remain constant across the 
life-cycle. Similarly, Caskey and Peterson (1994) show that economic circumstances and 
demographic characteristics alone cannot explain why so many Black families do not hold a 
checking account. In addition to many other reasons, this suggests that financial literacy 
may also play a role in explaining household behavior, particularly among those that display 
low wealth and very simple portfolios.   
 
ARE RETIREMENT SEMINARS EFFECTIVE? 
How can we explain the wide heterogeneity displayed by the data and, in 
particular, the very low wealth holdings that many households report even when they are 
few years away from retirement? In addition to many of the traditional explanations, for 
example that households have low permanent income, have been hit by many shocks, are 
impatient or expect huge capital gains on their assets, differences in planning costs can 
explain some of the differences in wealth holdings (Lusardi, 2000a). Households that face 
high planning costs because of low financial literacy or high search costs may not only 
save little but also follow simple rules of thumb such as setting consumption equal to 
income, as has been found in several studies using macro and micro data.
13 Additionally, 
households who face high planning costs may invest in very different portfolios than 
households who face low planning costs. The empirical findings reported in Lusardi 
(2000a) support these claims. 
                                                           
13 See Campbell and Mankiw (1990) for the evidence on macro data, Lusardi (1996) for evidence on micro 
data and the review of this evidence in Browning and Lusardi (1996).   23
Many employers have started offering some form of financial education in the 
workplace. By providing information and improving financial literacy, seminars should 
reduce planning costs and foster savings. However, there is still much uncertainty about 
the effects of seminars on savings. While several studies have found a positive correlation 
between attending a retirement seminar and private wealth or contributions to pension 
funds, it is not clear what this correlation means. Since attending retirement seminars is 
largely voluntary, it is possible that those who attend seminars are more likely to have an 
interest in them, for example because they have large wealth holdings. Thus, it may be 
wealth that affects participation in retirement seminars and not the other way around. 
Similarly, attending retirement seminars could simply reflect some individual 
characteristics such as patience and diligence, which are also likely to affect wealth 
accumulation. Thus, attending a retirement seminar could simply be a proxy for 
individual characteristics and attitudes towards saving rather than a measure of the effects 
of providing information, improving financial literacy, and/or reducing planning costs. 
Furthermore, as reported by Bernheim and Garrett (2002), retirement education is often 
remedial and thus offered in firms where workers do very little savings. Very few data 
sets have enough information to allow researchers to sort these effects out. Consequently, 
empirical results about the effects of retirement seminars are mixed and often difficult to 
interpret.  
There are several advantages in using the HRS to examine the effectiveness of 
retirement seminars. First, as reported in the previous tables, the HRS provides a richness 
of information on individual characteristics that can affect savings.  The HRS also reports   
retirement seminar attendance. This information can help alleviate the problem of broad   24
heterogeneity in individual behavior that we observe in micro data (see Tables 2 and 3). It 
can also alleviate the fact that attending retirement seminars could simply reflect some 
individual characteristics. Second, the detailed information about wealth allows me to 
overcome some severe shortcomings of previous papers on this topic. For example, 
Bernheim and Garrett (2002) have limited and noisy data about private savings. Other 
studies have only information about pension contributions and pension wealth, but no 
information about private wealth. Third, this is the group of households where the 
retirement motive should be most important. Finally, the HRS provides information that 
can be used to perform several estimation strategies (for example, instrumental variables 
estimation). 
To construct the final sample for the empirical estimation, I deleted respondents 
who do not report information on the variables mentioned in the previous sections and 
listed in the data appendix. The self-employed are not asked many of the questions about 
subjective future probabilities and are thus deleted from the sample. The question about 
job loss in the future is only asked to respondents who are working, so the final sample is 
restricted to respondents who are currently working. Since the distribution of the ratio of 
wealth to permanent income is so wide, I trim the distribution and exclude the top and 
bottom 1%.
14  
As in the majority of empirical studies on savings, I first use as my dependent 
variable the ratio of (non-pension) wealth over permanent income, but will use more 
                                                           
14 See the data appendix for a detailed description of the final sample and some simple statistics about the 
variables I use in the empirical work.   25
comprehensive measures of wealth in later sections.
15 I consider a measure of financial 
net worth, where I add IRAs and Keoghs to liquid net worth (see Table 4) and also 
consider total net worth and divide them by permanent income.  In Table 7, I report the 
results of regressing this ratio on a large set of explanatory variables and a retirement 
seminar dummy.  Among the set of explanatory variables, I consider not only age and age 
squared to capture the hump-shaped profile of wealth holdings, but also some simple 
demographics, such as the total number of children, and the number of children still 
living at home, gender, race, country of birth, marital status, and education that can 
account for heterogeneity in tastes. I also include dummies for regions of residence.
16  
Permanent income is included among the regressors to account for the fact that 
accumulation can vary across levels of permanent income and that, contrary to the simple 
life-cycle permanent income model, rich households are not simply a scaled-up version 
of poorer households.  I also account for health status, past shocks, preferences (risk 
aversion and impatience) and expectations about the future using the variables I 
explained in the previous section. Additionally, I account for whether households have 
pensions since, as mentioned in Table 2, they are more likely to work at firms that offer 
retirement seminars. 
As emphasized in Browning and Lusardi (1996), there are other motives to save 
apart from providing for retirement. Households may save to leave a bequest to future 
generations, and I account for this motive by using information on the intentions of 
                                                           
15Permanent income is constructed by regressing total household income on a set of demographics, firm 
characteristics, occupation and education dummies and those dummies interacted with age, and subjective 
expectations of income changes in the future. 
16For brevity, the estimates of these demographic variables are not reported, but are briefly discussed in the 
text.   26
leaving bequests to heirs.
17 Additionally, I consider a precautionary saving motive and 
proxy for it using the subjective variance of earnings risk. I also account for the fact that 
households accumulate little because they can rely on help from relatives and friends in 
case they run into severe financial difficulties in the future. I consider the possibility of 
receiving bequests in the future by using a dummy for whether at least one parent is alive, 
and I account for the expectation of giving financial help to family members in the future. 
I also include the subjective expectation of future events that can affect wealth 
accumulation (expectation that Social Security will be less generous and that house prices 
will increase more than the general price level). 
To understand the effect of retirement seminars, I consider regressions in the 
whole sample and, most importantly, quartile regressions. If, as reported by Bernheim 
and Garrett (2002), retirement education is remedial, it is offered to workers who most 
need it. Thus, one should find an effect at the lower quartiles of the wealth distribution.  
Even after accounting for a large set of controls, which are not present in other 
data sets,
18 I found that seminars affect wealth accumulation. The effect of seminars is 
positive and significant for the first quartile of total net worth, but dies out for higher 
quartiles of the distribution (Table 7). The effect is sizable economically. Attending a 
retirement seminars increases the net worth to permanent income ratio in the sample by 
6%. However, the effect is mostly coming from those at the bottom of the wealth 
                                                           
17 HRS respondents are asked whether “they plan to leave a sizable inheritance to their heirs” and I have 
grouped together all respondents that have answered with a “yes” to this questions, even though with 
several degrees of certainty (very likely, likely, etc.). 
18 Many of these controls play a role in explaining household savings. Even after accounting for many 
determinants of wealth, households whose head has a high education have higher savings. This again 
emphasizes the important role of education in explaining wealth holdings. Married couples have high 
savings, while children have a depressing effect on wealth. Blacks and Hispanics have much lower amounts 
of wealth. After accounting for permanent income and many variables that affect wealth holdings, women 
are found to be more likely and not less likely to accumulate higher amounts of wealth than men.   27
distribution. For the lowest quartile, attending a retirement seminar increases the wealth 
to income ratio by 40%.  The reason for such large change is that households at the 
bottom of the wealth distribution accumulate very little and even a small addition of 
wealth constitutes a large increase. For example, up to the first decile of the wealth to 
permanent income ratio, the ratio was 0.14 and becomes only 0.77 for the first quartile. 
  To further investigate this effect, I also consider regressions across education 
groups since, as mentioned before, there are very wide disparities across households with 
different education attainments. Again, I consider the effect of retirement seminars in the 
whole sample and across wealth quartiles (Tables 7a-b). Results are similar and again 
point to the fact that, since financial education is remedial, it affects mostly those at the 
bottom of the wealth distribution. The effect is important and sizable, particularly for 
those with less than a high school education. As reported in the previous table (Table 5), 
the accumulation of wealth is particularly low among households with low education.  
Individuals with low educations are disproportionately clustered at the bottom of the 
wealth-permanent income ratio distribution.  Consistent with the previous estimates, 
seminars increase the ratio by 45% for those who have low education and rank at the 
bottom of the distribution.  For those with high education but low wealth-permanent 
income ratios, seminars increase the ratio of wealth to permanent income by 30%. 
  Similar results are found when considering financial net worth. Retirement 
seminars affect the lowest two quartiles of the wealth distribution in the total sample 
(Table 8). They also affect the lowest two quartiles of the distribution across education 
group, again suggesting that seminars are effective for those with low wealth (Tables 8a-
b). The effects are again sizable, particularly for those at the bottom of the distribution, 
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who mostly have no financial wealth (and are often in debt). In the total sample, 
attending seminars increases the ratio of financial wealth to permanent income by 
approximately 18%.  This effect is coming mostly from the bottom of the distribution. 
Overall, the median ratio is increased by approximately 50%.  Again, the effect is coming 
from those with low education, where increases are also as high as 50%. 
  These estimates are remarkable and could well be a lower bound of the 
effectiveness of retirement seminars. Unfortunately, the HRR does not provide 
information about when the seminars were attended. If seminars were attended recently, 
wealth measures may not have fully incorporated the effects of seminars yet. Given that 
wealth is a stock, it takes time for seminars to affect it. Similarly, I do not have 
information on what were the content, length, and features covered in seminars.  
  On the other hand, the HRS is particularly valuable for evaluating the effects of 
retirement seminars, as it provides information not only about attending seminars but also 
about a rich set of variables that can influence savings. These variables matter for the 
empirical regressions and for evaluating the significance as well as the economic 
relevance of seminars. For example, if I account for a small set of demographics (age, 
gender, race, marital status, region, health status and education) and economic status 
(permanent income) only, I find that retirement seminars are significant in every 
regression  for the whole sample and across education groups.
19 However, when adding 
variables proxying for individual heterogeneity (smoking, drinking, exercising, checking 
health), the bequest and precautionary saving motive, and also subjective expectations 
about the future, the retirement seminars lose their significance for the whole sample. The 
importance of these variables can be seen in Table 7 and Tables 7a-b (and also Table 2).   29
Estimates for smoking and drinking are negative and strongly significant, in particular for 
those with low education and for those at the lower quartiles of the wealth distribution. 
The bequest motive is important in explaining accumulation, particularly for those with 
high education and for richer households. Among the subjective expectations variables,  
expectations that house prices will increase in the future is highly important. The sign is 
negative and significant in most regressions. This is again consistent with the observation 
made earlier that households have relatively little in financial assets, while their wealth is 
mostly in their house.
20 Conversely, those who report a high expectation to give financial 
help to a family member in the future tend to accumulate more wealth.
21 These results 
hold true for both total and financial net worth. Another notable result is that households 
that have a pension accumulate more rather than less wealth, showing that households 
that have high retirement wealth also have more in other forms of accumulation. These 
results are similar to those reported by Gustman and Steinmeier (1999a), who use HRS 
pension data from the Pension Provider data set rather than the self-reported pension data. 
These findings suggest that data sets that do not provide information to control for 
the large amount of heterogeneity present in savings data may lead to incorrect estimates 
of the effects of retirement seminars. This also hints at a potential selection problem: 
those who attend seminars may do so because they have a lot of wealth. They display 
characteristics, such as patience, discipline, and caring about future generations that 
shape not only the decision to attend seminars but also how much to save. In a later 
section, I perform Instrumental Variables (IV) rather than OLS estimation to overcome 
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21 For this variable, the causality may also go the other way.   30




As shown before, retirement seminars affect not only total (non-pension) net 
worth, but also financial wealth. This may be due to the fact that households not only 
save more after attending seminars but also may invest their wealth differently. Several 
papers have emphasized that there are transaction and learning costs in investing in 
stocks and that it is a puzzle why so many households do not invest in stocks.
22 
In Table 9, I examine whether retirement seminars have an effect on whether or 
not households invest in stocks.
23 In the sample under consideration, approximately 29% 
of households have invested in stocks. The median holdings of stock-owners is $15,000 
and one fourth have $4,000 or less in stocks. The percentage of stock ownership varies 
strongly across education groups (Table 6). I consider the same rich specification of 
variables as for total wealth. These variables include those considered in many studies on 
portfolio choice and I add several other important controls. To again account for the fact 
that retirement education is remedial, I consider estimates in the total sample and split the 
sample across wealth group. I also consider investment in stocks across education groups, 
a very important predictor of stock ownership, and again across wealth groups. 
What emerges from these simple estimates is that the theory has some predictive 
power in explaining stock ownership, but mainly for those with high education or high 
wealth. For example, for these households, high risk-aversion discourages stock 
                                                           
22 See Haliassos and Bertaut (1995).   31
ownership, while high income or a bequest motive encourages stock ownership. Again, if 
people have pensions, they are also more likely to invest in stocks (Table 9). 
Retirement seminars influence the ownership of stocks: those who have attended 
seminars are more likely to hold stocks. The analysis across sub-samples indicates that it 
is those with low wealth holdings that are affected by seminars, suggesting again that 
education is remedial and mainly influences those households who often do not hold 
stocks. The analysis across education groups confirms this finding.  For those with low 
education and lower wealth (those with less than $60,000), retirement seminars foster 
ownership of stocks, while there is no effect of seminars for those with high education 
(Table 9a). 
  As far as the economic importance is concerned, attending seminars raises the 
chance of investing in stock from 2 to 4 percentage points. This is not a small percentage 
given the baseline of 29% in the sample; attending seminars increases stock-ownership 
by 7-14%.  However, the estimates are again affected by the large set of controls included 
in the estimation. While these controls are not always strongly significant (or as 
significant as for wealth), they affect the empirical estimation. In general, estimates are 
much higher (and significant) both in the total sample and across education groups when 
considering only a set of controls that include the main demographic and economic 
variables. In the case of stocks, while they are not strongly significant, it is the variables 
proxying for individual heterogeneity (smoking, drinking, talking to a doctor about own 
health) that decreases the size and statistical significance of retirement seminars.   
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There is a good deal of heterogeneity in household investing behavior and this 
may also lead to self selection in attending seminars and also in investing in stocks. I turn 
to the IV estimation in the next section, which could potentially take care of some of the 
selection problems at both the firm and individual level. 
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES ESTIMATION 
One of the potential issues of evaluating the effectiveness of retirement seminars 
is that seminars are often not exogenous variables. As mentioned before, firms are more 
likely to give seminars when they think workers are not financially prepared for 
retirement. Bayer, Bernheim and Scholz (1996) examined a panel sample of employers 
and found that low participation in pensions among non-highly compensated employees 
was a strong predictor of the adoption and/or enhancement of educational offerings. 
Moreover, workers who attend those seminars are more likely to display (observable and 
un-observable) characteristics that also affect wealth, as shown in Table 2. If, as stated in 
Bernheim and Garrett (2002), one can identify a portion of the variation in attending 
retirement seminars that does not result from differences in savings, then it should be 
possible to distinguish between the hypothesis that knowledge causes the accumulation of 
wealth, and the hypothesis that wealth causes the acquisition of knowledge. This is done 
using instrumental variables. 
 There are two sets of instruments I can use in the HRS to assess the effects of 
attending retirement seminars on savings. The first set includes firm characteristics. I use 
variables that can predict the availability of retirement seminars in firms. Thus, I will try 
to capture the supply of these seminars. I use variables such as the size of firms (whether 
working in a firm with less than 25 employees) and whether the workers belong to a   33
union. In addition, I have obtained authorization to use geo-code identifiers and thus 
identify the state of residence for each household in the survey. I have constructed 
variables such as the proportion of large firms in the state as instruments. Since large 
firms are more likely to offer retirement seminars, I can rely on a proxy of availability 
rather than the use of retirement seminars.  
The second set of instruments is based on sibling data. If households face 
planning costs or difficulties in planning, they will be more likely to attend retirement 
seminars. Workers who can learn from the experience of older siblings face lower 
planning costs. Older siblings that have already gone through retirement can provide 
information on what is needed when one stops working. Those who can exploit that 
information may not attend retirement seminars. On the other hand, unpleasant 
circumstances regarding siblings, such as witnessing them in financial difficulties, can 
induce workers to attend retirement seminars. I have already used these variables in 
previous work (Lusardi (2000a)) and shown that they are successful instruments in 
predicting planning (and planning indexes) that include attending retirement seminars. 
  Given the large set of controls already included in the empirical regressions, it is 
very hard to find high predictive power for the instruments. Even when I consider all the 
instruments together, their predictive power in the first stage regression is not very high. 
This has to do not just with the property of the data, but with the theory as well. If we 
enrich the models with many reasons why people save (heterogeneity in preferences, 
differences in the budget constraints, the occurrence of shocks, different expectations 
about the future, inter and intra-generational transfers, etc.), we are left with no 
instruments for financial education since many variables can, in principle, predict wealth   34
directly. This again highlights the importance of a rich data set, like the HRS, that reports 
proxies for planning costs.  
  IV estimates are reported in Tables 10, 10a-b. For brevity, only the estimates 
about retirement seminars are provided.
24 Overall, estimates are statistically significant 
for net worth in the total sample and for the high education group. The empirical estimate 
is much higher than in the OLS case, indicating that there is a significant downward bias, 
but perhaps pointing also to the problem of weak instruments. Note, however, that the 
instruments have predictive power in the first stage and that an F-test of the joint 
significance of the instruments takes values always greater than 2.
25  While the IV 
estimates are not significant for financial net wealth, they are significant for stock 
ownership, confirming that seminars can influence whether or not households invest in 
stocks. It is difficult to look at sub-groups of this sample, as it is even harder for 
instruments to have predictive power. I find some significance of seminars for the high 
education sample. Given the low predictive power, IV estimation should be used with 
some caution. 
 
A COMPREHENSIVE MEASURE OF ACCUMULATION 
One of the potential drawbacks of the empirical work performed so far is that 
financial and total net worth are a limited measure of accumulation. For the median 10% 
of wealth holding households in the HRS, as much as 60% of total wealth is accounted 
                                                           
24 The list of instruments is as follows: proportion of big firms across states and this proportion squared and 
to the power of three, dummy for working in a small firm, dummy for belonging to a union, age difference 
between oldest sibling and respondent, number of siblings older than 62, siblings who are male, number of 
siblings who work, number of siblings who own a home, dummy for siblings who live nearby, dummy for 
whether the financial situation of siblings is better or worse than the financial situation of the respondent. 
See Lusardi (2000a) for a detailed discussion of these instruments.   35
for by Social Security and pensions (Gustman and Steinmeier  (1999a)). Pension wealth 
is rather unevenly distributed, accounting for 7% for those in the bottom quarter of 
wealth holders, but 31% for those in the 75
th to the 95
th percentile of households 
(Gustman, Mitchell, Samwick and Steinmeier (1999)). The share of Social Security in 
total accumulation (which includes private, pension and Social Security) is only slightly 
greater than the share of pensions. However, the effect of Social Security on the 
distribution of wealth is equalizing. What Gustman, Mitchell, Samwick and Steinmeier 
(1999) found in the HRS sample is that as one moves up the wealth distribution, their 
share of total accumulation due to pensions increases while the share of Social Security 
falls. Overall, pensions and Social Security account for half or more of total accumulation 
for households in all but the top decile of the wealth distribution  
There are several problems in considering a measure of total wealth accumulation 
that includes both pension and Social Security wealth. First, pensions and Social Security 
are not liquid or liquidable. It is often hard to borrow against these measures of wealth 
and it is not clear that households with large pension wealth can use it to smooth 
consumption before retirement. Second and most importantly, difficult and lengthy 
calculations are required to determine pension and Social Security wealth. As reported 
several times in the text and as described by Gustman and Steinmeier (1999b), many 
workers lack information on their pension.
26 However, these two components are so 
sizable that it may be very limiting to analyze the effects of seminars by looking only at 
non-pension financial and total net worth. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
25 See Staiger and Stock (1997) and Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995) for a thorough discussion of 
instrumental variables estimation in the presence of weak instruments. 
26 Social Security wealth is calculated as the present value of the Social Security benefit payable in the form 
of an annuity from retirement until death. The variable I consider refers to the HRS respondents’   36
In the empirical work that follows, I consider two measures of total accumulation. 
First, I consider a measure of pension wealth, as reported by the workers, and I sum it to 
total net worth. Second, I add Social Security wealth (the value of wealth at the time of 
the interview) to the previous measure. In the empirical regressions, I aim to assess 
whether attending a retirement seminar influences not just private wealth but also 
accumulation in pension and Social Security wealth. Estimates are reported in Tables 11 
and 11a. For brevity, only the estimates about retirement seminars are reported since they 
are the focus of the analysis.  
Both the OLS and IV estimates indicate that retirement seminars affect total 
accumulation. As before, the IV estimates are very high and given the weakness of 
instruments, they should be taken with caution. Note, however, that the estimates are 
always statistically significant for every measure of accumulation and for every sub-
sample. Estimates are also significant for every quartile of total accumulation (for 
brevity, estimates are not reported). The economic significance is in line with previous 
estimates. In the total sample, attending seminars increases the ratio of pension and total 
net worth over permanent income by approximately 20% and the ratio of pension, Social 
Security, and total net worth by 15%. Every education group is affected by retirement 
education when using these comprehensive measures of wealth. 
To check the robustness of these results, I perform the estimation on the sample of 
households whose financially knowledgeable person has a pension. As the estimates of 
several authors show, households with pensions usually have more private wealth as well 
and thus, perhaps the variable for seminars is capturing mostly the differences between 
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workers who have pensions and those who do not. As explained previously, firms which 
offer pensions are more likely to offer a retirement seminar. As reported by Gustman and 
Steinmeier (1999a), in the total HRS sample, the mean value of total accumulation for the 
median 10 percent of wealth-holding households is $406,259 for those who have 
pensions, while it is only $106,345 for those without pensions. For brevity, I report and 
discuss the result below without constructing another table. 
Estimates for the retirement seminars remain statistically significant; the OLS 
estimates are 0.856 (s.e. 0.188) for the first measure of total accumulation and 0.995 (s.e. 
0.211) for the second measure. IV estimates are much higher than the OLS estimates and 
the problem of weak instruments worsens in a smaller sample. Overall, however, the 
estimates in the sample of households with pensions confirm the previous finding of the 
effects of retirement seminars on total accumulation. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
  In this project, I examine the planning activity of households whose head is close 
to retirement. I find that a large percentage of households have done little or no planning 
for retirement. Women, in particular, are less likely to have planned for retirement. In my 
empirical work, I examine whether retirement seminars play a role in explaining the wide 
differences in wealth that we observe among older households. I find that seminars are 
remedial and they have effects for those at the bottom of the wealth distribution. 
Seminars are effective not only in influencing wealth, but also in affecting portfolio 
choice. Those who attend retirement seminars are more likely to hold stocks and, again, 
the effect is stronger for those at the bottom of the wealth distribution. When looking at   38
different estimation methods and a measure of accumulation that includes pension and 
Social Security wealth, the effects become even stronger, becoming significant for every 
education group and every quartile of the wealth distribution.  
  My estimates suggest that retirement seminars are a potentially important vehicle 
to influence the accumulation of both private and pension wealth. The ratio of non-
pension wealth to permanent income can be increased by 50% for the families at the 
bottom of the distribution and those with low education by offering financial education. 
The ratio of total wealth (inclusive of pension and Social Security) to permanent income 
can be increased by 15-20%  for both high and low education families. While the range 
of estimates is sometimes large, the results of the empirical work indicate that the 
provision of information and the reduction of planning costs may play a role in improving 
the financial security of many U.S. households.   39
Data Appendix 
  The data used in this paper are from the first wave of the Health and Retirement 
Study (HRS). The HRS is a representative sample of individuals born in the year 1931-
1941 (approximately 51-61 at interview), but blacks, Hispanics, and Floridians were 
over-sampled. The individual deemed most knowledgeable about the family’s assets, 
debts, and retirement planning was asked questions on housing, wealth, and income. 
   As described in more detail in the text, one distinctive feature of the HRS is the 
attention paid to expectations about future events. A second innovation of the HRS is the 
use of bracketing or unfolding techniques to reduce the size of the missing data problem 
in the measurement of financial variables. It is well known that missing data represent a 
major problem in survey measurements of household wealth. In the HRS respondents 
who reported they did not know or refused to provide an estimate of the size of a net 
worth component were asked to report the value in a set of brackets. Smith (1995) and 
Juster and Smith (1997) report an evaluation of these techniques and a detailed 
description of their advantages in improving the accuracy of information about household 
wealth. 
  To construct the final sample, I deleted the respondents who are partially or fully 
retired at the time of the interview. I also deleted the respondents that do not report 
information on the variables used in the empirical estimation. The self-employed are not 
asked many of the questions about subjective future probabilities and they are deleted 
from the sample. Similarly, expectations about changes in income are not asked to 
respondents who are not working and they are also excluded from the sample.  Since the 
distribution of the ratio of total and financial net worth to permanent income is so wide, I   40
trim the distribution and exclude the top and bottom 1%. The number of observations in 
my main final sample 3,265. The following table reports simple statistics of the variables 
used in the empirical estimation. The original sample where I only excluded respondents 
who are retired or younger than 50 and older than 61 had 5,292 observations. The 
decrease in the number of observations to 3,265 is mostly due to the fact that some 
questions are only asked to respondents who are working. I have examined whether the 
final sample suffers from self-selection. I found very little evidence of self-selection. 
With respect to the original sample, my final sample cover respondents who are a little 
younger, more likely to be white (the fraction of white is 0.79 in the original sample 
versus 0.818 in my sample), more likely to be born in the US (0.89 in the original sample 
versus 0.924 in my sample), a bit more educated (0.11 have a college degree versus 0.129 
in my sample). Overall, differences between these two samples are small.   41
 
Descriptive statistics of the final sample 
Variables mean (std.dev.) 
Financial net worth/permanent income  .758  (1.261) 
Total net worth/ permanent income   2.590  (2.628) 
(Total n. worth + pension)/perm. income  4.214  (3.512) 
(Total n. worth + pension + SS w.)/ p. income  6.727  (3.741) 
Stock ownership  .290  (.454) 
Have not thought about retirement .224  (.417) 
Attended a retirement seminar  .126  (.332) 
Age           54.40  (3.857) 
# of children at home  .806  (1.009) 
Male .507  (.500) 
White .818  (.385) 
U.S. born  .924  (.264) 
Married .624  (.484) 
Divorced .185  (.389) 
Widowed .086  (.282) 
Separated .035  (.177) 
Northeast region  .224  (.417) 
Midwest region  .249  (.433) 
West region  .185  (.389) 
High school  .388  (.487) 
Some college  .214  (.410) 
College .129  (.336 
More than college  .106  (.308) 
Excellent health  .276  (.447) 
Very good health  .331  (.470) 
Good health  .275  (.447) 
Past unemployment  .361  (.481) 
Past shocks  .328  (.469) 
Received inheritances  .197  (.397) 
Received money from relatives  .080  (.271) 
Received money from insurance settlements  .057  (.233) 
High risk aversion  .647  (.478) 
Moderate risk aversion  .130  (.336) 
Medium risk aversion  .108  (.311) 
Permanent income /1000  51.846  (20.990) 
Expectation n to live to 75   .660  (.276) 
Expectation that SS will be less generous  .605  (.289) 
Expectation that house prices will go  up  .480  (.286) 
Expect. to give major financial help to family  .406  (.307) 
   42
 
Descriptive statistics of the final sample (cont.) 
Heavy smoker  0.168  0.374 
Heavy drinker   .048  (.214) 
No regular exercise  .416  (.493) 
Talks to doctors about health  .783  (.412) 
Bequest .420  (.493) 
Parents still alive  .686  (.464) 
Variance of income  2.010  (7.687) 
Can rely on help from relatives & friends  .431  (.495) 
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Table 1: Planning for retirement 
 
 




  A lot  Some  A little  Hardly at 
All 
 
Characteristics         
Age < 54  0.32  0.38  0.40  0.39  0.36 
Female 0.46  0.44  0.50  0.60  0.45 
Black 0.12  0.06  0.11  0.13  0.07 
Hispanic 0.05  0.05  0.09  0.13  0.05 
Elementary 0.03  0.01  0.05  0.09  0.03 
Less than high school  0.17  0.12  0.17  0.23  0.14 
High School  0.38  0.35  0.37  0.36  0.33 
Some college  0.21  0.21  0.20  0.17  0.27 
College 0.11  0.16  0.12  0.08  0.13 
More than college  0.10  0.15  0.08  0.06  0.09 












Married 0.64  0.68  0.61  0.53  0.57 
















































          
# of obs  1,331  1,039  681  1,438  629 
 
Note: This table reports the percentages of respondents across the types of responses listed in the first row. All figures 
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Age 50-53  0.32   0.28   0.36  
Age 54-57  0.38   0.34   0.36  
Age 58-61  0.29   0.38   0.27  
White  0.85   0.90   0.79  
Male  0.58   0.54   0.51  
Married  0.72   0.73   0.61  
Less than high school  0.06   0.09   0.22  
High school  0.30   0.38   0.36  
More than high school  0.63   0.53   0.42  
Family of origin has high education  0.58   0.55   0.47  
Income < $25,000  0.11   0.14   0.29  
Have pension  0.84   0.60   0.49  
Have IRAs or Keoghs  0.63   0.63   0.41  
# of siblings older than 62  0.19   0.29   0.23  
Ability to think quickly  2.05   2.12   2.27  
Memory  14.44   13.89   13.14  
Analogy  7.49   7.19   6.37  
Heavy smoker  0.10   0.15   0.18  
Stopped smoking  0.45   0.42   0.37  
Drink heavily  0.04   0.05   0.05  
Feel should cut down on drinking  0.21   0.20   0.20  
Do not exercise  0.27   0.37   0.46  
Talk to a doctor about own health  0.83   0.81   0.77  
Expectation that health will limit work 
activity in the next 10 years  + 
0.36   0.38   0.39  
Expect. to live to 75 or more  0.68   0.67   0.65  
Expect. to work full-time after age 62 +  0.43   0.49   0.52  
Expectations that SS will become less 
generous 
0.59   0.62   0.59  
Expect. that house prices will increase 
faster than prices in the next 10 years 
0.46   0.48   0.49  
# of observations  506  1,191  5,292 
 
Note: This table reports the proportion of respondents who have attended a retirement seminar or asked 
Social Security to calculate retirement benefits. 
+ indicates that the means are calculated on the sample of workers only. 
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Table 3: Gender differences in the HRS 
Characteristics Female  Male 
    
Has thought a lot about retirement  0.24   0.27  
Has thought some about retirement  0.19   0.23  
Has thought a little about retirement 0.13    0.12 
Has hardly thought about retirement  0.31   0.20  
Has attended a retirement seminar  0.08   0.11 
Has asked SS to calculate retirement benefits  0.23   0.26  
White 0.76  0.82   
Black  0.13   0.08  
Hispanic 0.09    0.07 
Divorced  0.24   0.12  
Widowed  0.17   0.02  
Separated  0.05   0.03  
Less than high school education  0.26   0.19  
High school education  0.39   0.33  
More than high school  0.35   0.48  
High risk aversion  0.65   0.58  
Moderate risk aversion  0.11   0.12  
Low risk aversion  0.10   0.10  
Very low risk aversion  0.11   0.13  
Ability to think quickly  2.39   2.16  
Memory  13.55   12.74  
Analogy  6.21   6.54  
Family has stocks  0.23   0.34  
Family has IRAs  0.38   0.45  
Family owns a home  0.73   0.80  
Income < $25,000  0.40    0.19  
Total net worth < $10,000  0.22   0.12  
Would like to leave a bequest  0.37   0.47  
Heavy smoker  0.16   0.20  
Heavy drinker  0.02  0.08  
Talk to doctor about own health  0.82   0.73  
Expectation to live to 75 or more  0.66   0.64  
Expectation that SS will become less generous  0.58   0.61  
Expectation that house prices will increase faster than prices 
in general in the next 10 years 
0.50   0.49  
Expectation to give financial help to family members in the 
future 
0.36   0.43 
# of observations  2,637  2,655 
 
Note: This table reports gender differences across the characteristics listed in the first column. Figures are 
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Table 4: The distribution of household wealth 
 
Components of household wealth 
 




Housing Equity  Total Net 
Worth 
5  -6,000  0 0 0 
25  0 0 0  27,980 
50 6,000  0 42,000  96,000 
75  36,000 15,000 85,000  222,200 
90  110,000 45,000 150,000  475,000 
95  199,500 75,000 200,000  785,000 












Note: This table reports the distribution of total net worth and some of its components across households 
whose head is 50-61 years old and not fully or partially retired. The total number of observations is 5,292. 

































Household wealth across education, marital status, and gender 
 
Liquid Net Worth  Net Worth  Number of 
Observations  Median Mean  Median Mean 
        
Education Level          
Elementary 329  0  -707  9,000  82,215 
Less than High School  1,042  100  16,429  39,000  110,324 
High School  1,876  5,500  29,668  90,000  183,678 
Some College  1,041  10,000  47,312  122,700  243,571 
College 800  28,000  90,910  186,000  358,848 
More than College  204  41,000  175,160  234,000  636,366 
          
Marital Status           
Married 3,265  10,600  55,950  133,500  289,113 
Partner 120  2,000  26,498  60,000  228,928 
Separated 241  0  21,810  19,500  95,892 
Divorced 895  1,400  28,348  38,000  124,227 
Widowed 473  3,000  31,553  58,000  126,295 
Never Married  298  3,000  45,509  41,000  148,107 
          
            Gender          
Female 2,637  3,000  34,310  75,000  174,356 
Male 2,665  10,000  57627  118,700  278,795 
          
 
Note: This table reports the distribution of financial and total net worth across education, marital status, and 





























Assets & liabilities     
Check. & saving  0.30  0.63  0.85  0.90  0.95  0.95  0.82 
 CDs  0.03  0.14  0.28  0.29  0.34  0.30  0.26 
 Bonds  0.00  0.01  0.04  0.07  0.14  0.27  0.07 
 Stocks  0.01  0.10  0.24  0.34  0.51  0.55  0.28 
 IRAs & Keoghs  0.05  0.16  0.41  0.48  0.62  0.71  0.41 
 Other Assets  0.02  0.07  0.13  0.20  0.25  0.36  0.16 
 Businesses  0.05  0.09  0.13  0.20  0.18  0.29  0.15 
 Housing  0.48  0.64  0.80  0.80  0.82  0.83  0.74 
 Real Estate  0.15  0.18  0.27  0.37  0.41  0.49  0.30 
 Vehicles  0.59  0.79  0.92  0.94  0.95  0.97  0.89 
 Debt  0.24  0.36  0.40  0.44  0.38  0.37  0.39 
          
 
Note: This table reports the ownership of assets across education groups. The number of observations is 
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  Total Net worth 
 Total  Sample  1
st quartile  Median  3
rd quartile 
  Coeff.  Std. err Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err  Coeff.  Std. err
constant -2.044  6.148  -2.061  3.112  -4.044  5.454  -1.904  7.108 
seminar  0.149 0.133  0.308**  0.069  0.175 0.124  0.019 0.164 
excellent health     0.560**  0.164  0.304**  0.088  0.455**  0.149  0.907**  0.195 
very good health  0.195  0.154  0.186**  0.081  0.291**  0.139  0.407**  0.181 
good health  0.170  0.152  0.218**  0.078  0.264*  0.136  0.432**  0.177 
permanent inc./1000  -0.033** 0.006  -0.001  0.003  -0.013** 0.006  -0.036** 0.008 
past unemployment  -0.290** 0.096  -0.142*  0.050  -0.313** 0.088  -0.344** 0.117 
past shocks  -0.522** 0.093  -0.293** 0.050  -0.392** 0.087  -0.571** 0.115 
received inheritances  0.672**  0.112  0.293** 0.061  0.507** 0.106 0.813**  0.138 
money from relatives  0.723**  0.158  0.359**  0.085  0.728**  0.150  0.794**  0.200 
money from insurance  0.797**  0.208  0.561**  0.108  0.760**  0.198  0.641**  0.252 
high risk aversion  0.009  0.139  0.124*  0.072  0.131  0.128  0.369**  0.165 
medium risk aversion  0.106  0.173  0.140  0.092  0.166  0.161  0.421**  0.208 
moderate risk aversion  -0.093  0.181  0.167*  0.095  0.231  0.168  0.103  0.218 
variance of income  0.007  0.005  0.003  0.004  0.021**  0.005  0.026**  0.005 
expect. live to 75  0.078  0.166  -0.128  0.088  0.036  0.153  -0.018  0.198 
expect. SS more gener.  -0.125  0.149  0.021  0.078  0.045  0.137  -0.139  0.184 
expect. house price up  -0.452** 0.153  -0.236** 0.082  -0.447** 0.141  -0.489** 0.186 
exp. give help to fam.  0.359**  0.143 0.079  0.074 0.284**  0.132 0.551**  0.176 
bequests 1.115**  0.089  0.543**  0.047  0.877**  0.083  1.288**  0.110 
can rely on help  0.008  0.088  0.084  0.046  0.135*  0.082  0.194*  0.109 
parent alive  -0.142  0.102  0.034  0.053  0.023  0.094  -0.180  0.124 
heavy smoker  -0.479** 0.119  -0.287** 0.065  -0.433** 0.112  -0.702** 0.146 
heavy drinker  -0.324  0.203  -0.232** 0.110  -0.102  0.188  -0.094  0.238 
no regular exercise  -0.268** 0.093  -0.176** 0.050  -0.219** 0.087  -0.286** 0.114 
talk to doc about health  0.309**  0.106  0.084  0.056  0.157  0.099  0.460**  0.129 
pension  0.174* 0.102 0.189**  0.054 0.186**  0.094 0.164  0.126 
        
Adjusted/Pseudo R
2 0.158  0.112  0.113  0.130 
 
Note: This table reports OLS and quantile regressions of total net worth over permanent income on the 
variables listed in the first column. Even though not reported, regressions include several demographic 
variables. Refer to the text for a complete list of the variables used in the estimation.  
*  indicates significance at the 10% level 








Table 7a: Explaining household saving 
 
Low education sample 
 
  Total Net worth 
 Total  Sample  1
st quartile  Median  3
rd quartile 
  Coeff.  Std. err Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err  Coeff.  Std. err
constant 4.485  8.556  -1.939  3.418  0.915  5.813  0.632  14.238
seminar  0.085 0.209  0.272**  0.089  0.134 0.146  0.131 0.373 
excellent health     0.561**  0.207  0.243**  0.084  0.464**  0.145  0.862**  0.373 
very good health  0.233  0.190  0.203**  0.084  0.451**  0.131  0.355  0.338 
good health  0.052  0.182  0.113  0.079  0.304**  0.125  0.271  0.321 
permanent inc./1000  -0.038** 0.007  0.004  0.003  -0.012** 0.086  -0.038** 0.014 
past unemployment  -0.225*  0.124  -0.109** 0.054  -0.269** 0.086  -0.275  0.224 
past shocks  -0.452** 0.128  -0.270** 0.058  0.344**  0.091  -0.420*  0.231 
received inheritances  0.895**  0.169  0.474** 0.075  0.658** 0.121 0.993**  0.310 
money from relatives  0.736**  0.246  0.436**  0.113  0.825**  0.178  0.757*  0.450 
money from insurance  0.994**  0.288  0.602**  0.129  0.971**  0.203  0.519  0.516 
high risk aversion  0.022  0.202  0.192**  0.088  0.110  0.141  0.440  0.343 
medium risk aversion  0.275  0.254  0.253**  0.111  0.337*  0.178  0.331  0.451 
moderate risk aversion  -0.056  0.258  0.265**  0.114  0.053  0.182  0.059  0.449 
variance of income  0.043**  0.017  0.031**  0.007  0.030**  0.012  0.062**  0.027 
expect. live to 75  0.137  0.213  -0.116  0.095  0.049  0.149  -0.078  0.377 
expect. SS more gener.  -0.071  0.199  0.101  0.086  0.096  0.137  -0.047  0.355 
expect. house price up  -0.568** 0.200  -0.277** 0.090  -0.537** 0.139  -0.425  0.357 
exp. give help to fam.  0.107  0.191 0.059  0.082 0.255* 0.133 0.198  0.353 
bequests 1.118**  0.124  0.513**  0.055  0.860**  0.087  1.280**  0.226 
can rely on help  -0.035  0.121  0.024  0.053  0.070  0.085  0.321  0.223 
parent alive  0.006  0.134  0.035  0.059  0.175*  0.095  0.120  0.243 
heavy smoker  -0.367** 0.151  -0.284** 0.070  -0.357** 0.108  -0.481*  0.277 
heavy drinker  -0.422  0.276  -0.256** 0.125  -0.221  0.190  -0.269  0.460 
no regular exercise  -0.227*  0.123  -0.091*  0.054  -0.165*  0.086  -0.271  0.224 
talk to doc about health  0.183  0.137  0.073  0.061  0.063  0.096  0.247  0.250 
pension 0.392**  0.130  0.269**  0.057  0.220**  0.091  0.397*  0.237 
        
Adjusted/Pseudo R
2 0.158  0.112  0.113  0.130 
 
Note: This table reports OLS and quantile regressions of total net worth over permanent income on the 
variables listed in the first column. Estimates refer to the sample of respondents with high school education 
or lower. Even though not reported, regressions include several demographic variables. Refer to the text for 
a complete list of the variables used in the estimation.  
* indicates significance at the 10% level 
** indicates significance at the 5% level 
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Table 7b: Explaining household saving 
 
High education sample 
 
  Total Net worth 
 Total  Sample  1
st quartile  Median  3
rd quartile 
  Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err  Coeff.  Std. err
constant -8.398  8.803  -7.014  5.773  -9.750  5.595  -14.730  12.091
seminar  0.196 0.175  0.297**  0.111  0.139 0.116  0.131 0.255 
excellent health     0.670**  0.292  0.386*  0.198  0.464**  0.193  0.936**  0.402 
very good health  0.307  0.281  0.176  0.188  0.260  0.185  0.399  0.383 
good health  0.457  0.285  0.302*  0.188  0.313*  0.187  0.544  0.387 
permanent inc./1000  -0.009  0.006  -0.002  0.004  -0.005  0.004  -0.004  0.009 
past unemployment  -0.355** 0.154  -0.198*  0.102  -0.365** 0.103  -0.447*  0.230 
past shocks  -0.637** 0.137  -0.309** 0.092  -0.313** 0.092  -0.652** 0.200 
received inheritances  0.436**  0.152  0.179* 0.103 0.285**  0.103 0.588**  0.222 
money from relatives  0.640**  0.208  0.228*  0.139  0.709**  0.142  0.785**  0.316 
money from insurance  0.679**  0.303  0.402**  0.203  0.352*  0.210  0.541  0.429 
high risk aversion  -0.052  0.194  0.155  0.127  0.110  0.129  0.082  0.283 
medium risk aversion  -0.099  0.238  0.141  0.161  0.118  0.160  0.241  0.349 
moderate risk aversion  -0.201  0.256  0.096  0.169  0.411*  0.173  0.268  0.380 
variance of income  0.001  0.006  0.002  0.002  0.008**  0.004  0.013**  0.006 
expect. live to 75  -0.059  0.271  -0.161  0.185  -0.102  0.181  0.388  0.374 
expect. SS more gener.  -0.268  0.229  -0.047  0.149  0.042  0.154  -0.247  0.339 
expect. house price up  -0.276  0.243  -0.133  0.165  -0.054  0.161  -0.825** 0.343 
exp. give help to fam.  0.650**  0.217 0.100  0.143 0.241* 0.146 0.599* 0.309 
bequests 1.123**  0.129  0.572**  0.085  0.957**  0.087  1.188**  0.192 
can rely on help  0.064  0.129  0.213**  0.087  0.221**  0.087  -0.007  0.187 
parent alive  -0.340** 0.159  0.048  0.105  -0.144  0.108  -0.442*  0.228 
heavy smoker  -0.648** 0.195  -0.364** 0.137  -0.598** 0.133  -0.880** 0.212 
heavy drinker  -0.093  0.302  -0.012  0.206  0.112  0.202  0.0561  0.454 
no regular exercise  -0.321** 0.144  -0.243** 0.097  -0.410** 0.098  -0.211  0.212 
talk to doc about health  0.508**  0.171  0.136  0.117  0.308**  0.116  0.669**  0.245 
pension -0.320*  0.169  0.139  0.114  0.038  0.113  -0.586**  0.253 
        
Adjusted/Pseudo R
2 0.164  0.107  0.110  01.45 
 
Note: This table reports OLS and quantile regressions of total net worth over permanent income on the 
variables listed in the first column. Estimates refer to the sample of respondents with more than high school 
education. Even though not reported, regressions include several demographic variables. Refer to the text 
for a complete list of the variables used in the estimation. 
* indicates significance at the 10% level  
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  Financial Net Worth 
 Total  Sample  1
st quartile  Median  3
rd quartile 
  Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err  Coeff.  Std. err
constant  -0.274  3.000 -0.036  0.494 -0.958  1.753  2.216  3.575 
seminar  0.137**  0.065 0.088** 0.011 0.134** 0.040  0.103  0.086 
excellent health     0.144*  0.080  0.058**  0.013  0.071  0.048  0.146  0.102 
very  good  health  0.091  0.075 0.076** 0.012 0.073  0.045  0.108  0.095 
good  health  0.069  0.074 0.048** 0.012 0.025  0.044  0.088  0.093 
permanent  inc./1000  -0.004 0.003  0.0008 0.0005 -0.0005  0.002 -0.001 0.004 
past  unemployment  -0.004  0.047 -0.023** 0.008 -0.027  0.028  -0.055  0.061 
past  shocks  -0.287**  0.045 -0.067** 0.008 -0.13**  0.028  -0.279**  0.059 
received inheritances  0.248**  0.055  0.043** 0.009 0.254** 0.034 0.350**  0.072 
money from relatives  0.229**  0.077  0.022  0.013  0.118** 0.049  0.301**  0.103 
money from insurance  0.490**  0.101  0.089**  0.017  0.359** 0.063  0.570**  0.133 
high risk aversion  -0.113*  0.068  0.007  0.011  0.004  0.041  0.021  0.087 
medium risk aversion  -0.127  0.084  0.036**  0.014  0.020  0.052  0.042  0.109 
moderate risk aversion  -0.186** 0.088  0.014  0.015  -0.019  0.054  -0.126  0.113 
variance of income  0.003  0.003  0.003**  0.0007 0.008** 0.001  0.014**  0.003 
expect. live to 75  0.022  0.081  -0.020  0.014  -0.029  0.049  0.042  0.103 
expect. SS more gener.  0.067  0.073  0.007  0.012  0.015  0.044  0.105  0.095 
expect. house price up  -0.261** 0.075  -0.029** 0.013  -0.064  0.045  -0.280** 0.096 
exp. give help to fam.  0167**  0.070  0.031** 0.012 0.025  0.042  0.126  0.092 
bequests  0.312**  0.043 0.099** 0.007 0.203** 0.027  0.428**  0.057 
can rely on help  0.031  0.043  0.027**  0.007  0.045*  0.026  0.053  0.056 
parent  alive  -0068  0.050 0.011  0.008 -0.011  0.030  -0.004  0.064 
heavy  smoker  -0.179**  0.058 -0.038** 0.010 -0.09**  0.036  -0.190**  0.077 
heavy  drinker  -0.028  0.099 -0.002  0.017 -0.015  0.060  -0.015  0.127 
no regular exercise  -0.091** 0.045  -0.022** 0.008  -0.06**  0.028  -0.099*  0.059 
talk to doc about health  0.161**  0.052  0.016*  0.009  0.035  0.032  0.172**  0.067 
pension  -0.029    0.050  0.0006  0.008  0.005  0.030  0.008  0.066 
        
Adjusted/Pseudo R
2  0.129 0.049 0.097 0.131 
 
Note: This table reports OLS and quantile regressions of financial net worth over permanent income on the 
variables listed in the first column. Even though not reported, regressions include several demographic 
variables. Refer to the text for a complete list of the variables used in the estimation.  
* indicates significance at the 10% level  
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Table 8a: Explaining household savings 
 
Low education sample 
 
  Financial Net Worth 
 Total  Sample  1
st quartile  Median  3
rd quartile 
  Coeff.  Std. err Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err  Coeff.  Std. err
constant 3.560  4.069  0.094  0.614  0.572  1.582  2.756  4.202 
seminar  0.127 0.099  0.051** 0.015  0.088**  0.041  0.070 0.115 
excellent health     0.257**  0.099  0.025*  0.015  0.027  0.040  0.137  0.109 
very good health  0.198**  0.091  0.060** 0.014  0.064*  0.037  0.114  0.098 
good  health  0.145* 0.087 0.023*  0.013 -0.004  0.035 0.077  0.094 
permanent inc./1000  -0.003  0.003  0.002** 0.0005  0.003**  0.001  0.004  0.004 
past unemployment  0.001  0.059  -0.02** 0.009  -0.025  0.024  -0.064  0.067 
past shocks  -0.249** 0.061  -0.04** 0.009  -0.115** 0.025  -0.25**  0.069 
received inheritances  0.166**  0.080  0.033** 0.012 0.183**  0.034 0.225**  0.093 
money from relatives  0.055  0.117  0.052** 0.019  0.034  0.050  0.010  0.137 
money from insurance  0.473**  0.137  0.082** 0.021  0.243**  0.058  0.737**  0.157 
high risk aversion  -0.038  0.096  0.002  0.014  -0.009  0.039  0.115  0.105 
medium risk aversion  -0.038  0.121  0.035*  0.019  0.019  0.050  0.143  0.135 
moderate risk aversion  -0.081  0.123  0.010  0.019  -0.050  0.050  -0.011  0.135 
variance of income  0.017**  0.008  0.006** 0.001  0.011**  0.003  0.023**  0.011 
expect. live to 75  0.017  0.101  -0.010  0.015  -0.035  0.041  0.024  0.112 
expect. SS more gener.  0.061  0.095  -0.005  0.014  0.025  0.038  0.0007  0.105 
expect. house price up  -0.277** 0.095  -0.04** 0.015  -0.046  0.039  -0.200*  0.105 
exp. give help to fam.  0.116  0.091 0.030** 0.014 0.031  0.037 0.093  0.104 
bequests 0.291**  0.059  0.063** 0.009  0.148**  0.024  0.341**  0.068 
can rely on help  -0.019  0.057  0.008  0.009  0.022  0.024  0.036  0.065 
parent alive  -0.038  0.064  0.011  0.010  -0.017  0.026  -0.024  0.072 
heavy smoker  -0.165** 0.072  -0.02** 0.011  -0.058*  0.030  -0.194** 0.082 
heavy drinker  -0.144  0.131  -0.007  0.020  -0.054  0.053  -0.008  0.138 
no regular exercise  -0.049  0.058  -0.012  0.009  -0.06**  0.024  -0.024  0.066 
talk to doc about health  0.127*  0.065  0.012  0.010  0.047*  0.027  0.114  0.075 
pension 0.021  0.062  -0.002  0.009  -0.001  0.025  -0.005  0.071 
        
Adjusted/Pseudo R
2 0.105  0.028  0.076  0.121 
 
Note: This table reports OLS and quantile regressions of financial net worth over permanent income on the 
variables listed in the first column. Estimates refer to the sample of respondents with high school education 
or lower. Even though not reported, regressions include several demographic variables. Refer to the text for 
a complete list of the variables used in the estimation.  
* indicates significance at the 10% level  
** indicates significance at the 5% level   58
Table 8b: Explaining household savings 
 
High education sample 
 
  Financial net worth 
 Total  Sample  1
st quartile  Median  3
rd quartile 
  Coeff.  Std. err Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err  Coeff.  Std. err
constant -3.429  4.471  0.902  1.225  0.325  1.938  -2.485  6.754 
seminar  0.115 0.088  0.119**  0.027  0.101**  0.040  0.127 0.149 
excellent health     -0.137  0.148  0.077*  0.045  0.046  0.068  0.104  0.244 
very good health  -0.175  0.143  0.067  0.043  0.060  0.065  0.077  0.234 
good health  -0.150  0.144  0.062  0.043  0.023  0.066  0.100  0.235 
permanent inc./1000  0.003  0.003  0.004**  0.001  0.003**  0.001  0.001  0.005 
past  unemployment  0.0002 0.078 -0.028 0.024 -0.041  0.036 -0.112 0.134 
past shocks  -0.336** 0.070  -0.096** 0.022  -0.175** 0.032  -0.315** 0.115 
received inheritances  0.300**  0.077  0.062** 0.025  0.295** 0.036 0.488**  0.132 
money from relatives  0.360**  0.106  0.005  0.034  0.141**  0.050  0.586**  0.180 
money from insurance  0.508**  0.154  0.179**  0.051  0.300**  0.073  0.339  0.253 
high risk aversion  -0.203** 0.098  0.022  0.030  0.014  0.045  -0.087  0.167 
medium risk aversion  -0.203*  0.121  0.047  0.037  0.051  0.056  -0.081  0.207 
moderate risk aversion  -0.301** 0.130  0.001  0.040  0.032  0.060  -0.221  0.218 
variance of income  0.0008  0.003  0.001  0.001  0.006**  0.001  0.012**  0.004 
expect. live to 75  0.037  0.137  -0.038  0.043  0.027  0.063  -0.069  0.223 
expect. SS more gener.  0.045  0.116  0.019  0.036  0.026  0.054  0.118  0.201 
expect. house price up  -0.244** 0.123  -0.035  0.039  -0.127** 0.057  -0.443** 0.206 
exp. give help to fam.  0.219**  0.110 0.051  0.035 0.046  0.051 0.155  0.186 
bequests 0.357**  0.066  0.124**  0.021  0.222**  0.030  0.517**  0.113 
can rely on help  0.076  0.065  0.070**  0.020  0.118**  0.030  0.119  0.112 
parent alive  -0.086  0.081  0.037  0.025  -0.022  0.037  0.058  0.134 
heavy smoker  -0.194*  0.099  -0.077** 0.032  -0.126** 0.047  -0.268  0.170 
heavy drinker  0.162  0.153  0.049  0.048  0.084  0.071  0.023  0.285 
no regular exercise  -0.161** 0.073  -0.019  0.023  -0.086** 0.034  -0.245** 0.122 
talk to doc about health  0.201**  0.087  0.008  0.027  0.025  0.041  0.185  0.146 
pension -0.162*  0.086  -0.025  0.026  0.015  0.040  -0.098  0.150 
        
Adjusted/Pseudo R
2 0.135  0.065  0.103  0.132 
 
Note: This table reports OLS and quantile regressions of financial net worth over permanent income on the 
variables listed in the first column. Estimates refer to the sample of respondents with more than high school 
education. Even though not reported, regressions include several demographic variables. Refer to the text 
for a complete list of the variables used in the estimation.  
* indicates significance at the 10% level  
** indicates significance at the 5% level 
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Table 9: Explaining stock ownership 
 
Total sample and wealth groups 
 
 Stock  ownership 
  Total Sample  Low wealth 





  Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err Coeff Std. err  Coeff. Std. err
seminar  0.042* 0.024  0.033*  0.027  0.044 0.049 0.034 0.033 
excellent health     0.134**  0.038  0.041*  0.037  0.038  0.064  0.133**  0.054 
very  good  health  0.141**  0.035 0.094** 0.049 0.087  0.060  0.122** 0.051 
good  health  0.091**  0.035 0.041*  0.029 -0.030  0.045  0.085*  0.052 
permanent  inc./1000 0.004**  0.001  0.0008** 0.0004 0.004*  0.002 0.002 0.002 
past  unemployment  -0.028  0.018 -0.005  0.007 0.025  0.032  -0.021  0.027 
past  shocks  -0.014  0.017  0.009 0.007  0.010 0.028 -0.008  0.027 
received inheritances  0.091**  0.022  0.032** 0.021 0.025  0.040 0.098**  0.029 
money from relatives  0.054*  0.030  -0.013  0.005  -0.012  0.052  0.054  0.039 
money from insurance  0.024  0.041  0.028  0.042  -0.047  0.049  -0.005** 0.055 
high risk aversion  -0.041  0.027  -0.005  0.009  0.003  0.045  -0.08  0.042 
medium risk aversion  -0.022  0.031  0.009  0.016  -0.023  0.049  -0.062  0.047 
moderate risk aversion  -0.006  0.034  0.018  0.021  -0.023  0.051  -0.041  0.051 
variance of income  0.001*  0.0009 0.001  0.001  0.006*  0.004  0.0008  0.001 
expect. live to 75  -0.024  0.033  -0.008  0.012  -0.051  0.051  0.007  0.049 
expect. SS more gener.  0.012  0.028  -0.009  0.011  -0.063  0.047  0.046  0.042 
expect. house price up  -0.029  0.029  0.009  0.011  0.005  0.051  -0.038  0.044 
exp. give help to fam.  0.062**  0.027  -0.009  0.011  0.008 0.047 0.059 0.040 
bequests  0.072**  0.017 0.019** 0.012 -0.010  0.027  0.051** 0.023 
can rely on help  0.034**  0.016  0.021**  0.010  0.002  0.028  0.027  0.024 
parent  alive  -0.003  0.019 0.001  0.006 -0.031  0.034  -0.003  0.029 
heavy  smoker  -0.030  0.022 -0.010  0.006 -0.007  0.034  0.023  0.037 
heavy  drinker  -0.001  0.038  0.007 0.019  0.065 0.116 -0.013  0.055 
no regular exercise  -0.027  0.017  -0.006  0.007  0.021  0.028  -0.015  0.026 
talk to doc about health  0.067**  0.019  0.004  0.007  0.055*  0.027  0.081**  0.029 
pension  0.098**  0.018 0.022** 0.009 0.026  0.030  0.093** 0.03 
      
Pseudo R
2 0.16  0.32  0.20  0.091 
 
Note: This table reports probit regressions of stock ownership on the variables listed in the first column. 
The estimates reported are the marginal effects. Even though not reported, regressions include several 
demographic variables. Refer to the text for a complete list of the variables used in the estimation.  
* indicates significance at the 10% level  
** indicates significance at the 5% level   60
Table 9a: Explaining stock ownership 
 
Education and wealth groups 
 
  Low education  High education 
 Low  wealth 







  Coeff.  Std. err Coeff. Std. err Coeff. Std. err  Coeff.  Std. err
seminar  0.028* 0.022  0.014  0.051 0.009  0.065  0.040  0.043 
excellent health     0.020  0.023  0.162**  0.071  0.088  0.100  0.071  0.083 
very good health  0.041** 0.025  0.182**  0.065  0.215**  0.093  0.028  0.082 
good  health  0.021 0.018 0.155**  0.067  -0.012 0.075  -0.031 0.082 
permanent inc./1000  0.002** 0.0005  0.0038*  0.002  0.005**  0.001  0.002  0.002 
past unemployment  -0.011  0.009  -0.033  0.034  0.006  0.039  -0.008  0.042 
past  shocks  0.003 0.008 -0.014 0.036  0.034  0.035  -0.005 0.037 
received inheritances  0.032** 0.023  0.085** 0.042  -0.020  0.043 0.116**  0.038 
money from relatives  0.041  0.046  0.093*  0.059  -0.086*  0.033  0.037  0.052 
money from insurance  -0.005  0.019  0.041  0.082  0.035  0.114  -0.052  0.077 
high risk aversion  0.025*  0.013  -0.119*  0.065  -0.066  0.050  -0.087*  0.054 
medium risk aversion  0.098** 0.069  -0.152** 0.054  -0.071  0.040  0.019  0.065 
moderate risk aversion  0.055*  0.048  -0.174** 0.052  0.004  0.068  0.062  0.068 
variance of income  0.0001  0.001  0.004  0.004  0.006  0.005  0.0003  0.001 
expect. live to 75  -0.0007  0.014  0.010  0.062  -0.183** 0.072  -0.029  0.073 
expect. SS more gener.  -0.012  0.014  0.002  0.056  -0.069  0.064  0.081  0.060 
expect. house price up  -0.003  0.013  0.063  0.057  0.059  0.067  -0.131** 0.065 
exp. give help to fam.  -0.006  0.013 -0.009 0.053  0.069  0.061  0.130**  0.058 
bequests  0.016 0.011 0.027  0.032  0.044  0.043  0.065**  0.033 
can rely on help  0.002  0.008  0.020  0.032  0.030  0.037  0.031  0.034 
parent alive  0.015*  0.008  0.002  0.037  -0.121** 0.050  0.022  0.043 
heavy smoker  -0.003  0.009  -0.035  0.044  -0.063  0.037  0.077  0.057 
heavy drinker  0.016*  0.008  0.062*  0.033  0.187*  0.138  -0.014  0.080 
no regular exercise  0.006  0.008  -0.023  0.033  -0.032  0.035  0.008  0.04 
talk to doc about health  0.020** 0.008  0.062**  0.036  0.011  0.042  0.100**  0.045 
pension 0.015*  0.009  0.093**  0.035  0.059  0.037  0.075  0.047 
        
Adjusted/Pseudo R
2 0.25  0.089  0.25  0.077 
 
Note: This table reports probit regressions of stock ownership on the variables listed in the first column 
across education and wealth groups. The estimates reported are the marginal effects. Even though not 
reported, regressions include several demographic variables. Refer to the text for a complete list of the 
variables used in the estimation 
* indicates significance at the 10% level  
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Table 10:  Instrumental variables estimation 
 
Total Net Worth 
  Total Sample  Low education  High education 
  Coeff. Std.  Err.  Coeff. Std.  Err.  Coeff. Std.  Err. 
Seminar  2.012**  0.975 0.816 1.379 3.026**  1.417 
       
 
Table 10a:  Instrumental variables estimation 
 
Financial Net Worth 
  Total Sample  Low education  High education 
  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff..  Std err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
Seminar  0.452 0.463 0.297 0.654 0.125 0.652 
       
 
Table 10b:  Instrumental variables estimation 
 
Stock Ownership 
  Total Sample  Low education  High education 
  Coeff. Std.  Err.  Coeff. Std.  Err.  Coeff. Std.  Err. 
Seminar  0.405**  0.169 0.300 0.208 0.171 0.259 
       
 
Note: These tables report instrumental variables estimation of wealth and stock ownership on retirement 
seminar and many other variables. Refer to the text for a detailed description of the variables and the 
instruments used in the estimation. 
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Table 11:  Total household accumulation 
 
Total Net Worth + Pension Wealth 
  Total Sample  Low education  High education 
  Coeff. Std.  Err.  Coeff. Std.  Err.  Coeff. Std.  Err. 
Seminar 
(OLS) 
0.893** 0.172  0.788** 0.251  0.947** 0.256 
Seminar 
(IV) 
6.077** 1.380  4.792** 1.844  6.792** 2.206 
 
Table 11a:  Total household accumulation 
 
Total Net Worth + Pension Wealth + Social Security Wealth 
  Total Sample  Low education  High education 
  Coeff. Std.  Err.  Coeff. Std.  Err.  Coeff. Std.  Err. 
Seminar 
(OLS) 
1.058** 0.195  0.836** 0.290  1.215** 0.276 
Seminar 
(IV) 
5.895** 1.381  5.876** 2.165  6.713** 2.018 
 
Note: These tables report OLS and IV estimates of two measures of total accumulation on retirement 
seminar and many other variables. Refer to the text for a detailed description of the variables and the 
instruments used in the estimation. 
** indicates significance at the 5% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 